02 Aurelia and Montejo
Updated: Nov 11

Advanced Lafferty. What comes next won’t depend on it.
Not much has been written about Aurelia, but of the handful of things said about it, by far the most interesting and intellectually strongest is Gregorio Montejo’s essay “Eudaimonism in R. A. Lafferty’s Aurelia,” which appeared in Feast of Laughter in 2015. Anyone who wants to read Aurelia seriously should understand its argument. As a teacher of mine used to say, firstest with the mostist criticism.
I think Montejo’s argument is largely correct, but correctness is not adequacy. I’ll follow his argument, noting where I agree and where it needs supplementing.
Most of my quibbles would be unfair, since they go beyond what Montejo sets out to do. He writes about a specialized topic for a general audience, at the beginning of the now sadly snuffed out Lafferty Renaissance. There is no reason he should advance distinctions that might distract from his main, pathbreaking points. His argument is presented in academic machinery, unnecessary given what he says and the amount of concrete Lafferty text explicated.
He is dead-on right about two main points. First, Aurelia must be understood in relation to both her life during her assignment on Planet X and her teaching, and the teaching must be read through her life. Without both, the novel will not hold together. Second, Aurelia’s homilies converge on the meaning of life, which is happiness, and Lafferty’s view of this, in its general form, is Aristotelian-Thomistic. Montejo’s essay can be found here.
The diagrams use these evidence codes:

Montejo’s main claim:

The argument:

1.1. The relation between kerygma and didache has become immensely complicated since the distinction was made nearly a century ago by the Protestant theologian C. H. Dodd. I find it a useful analytic distinction, but scholarship since Dodd leaves me unconvinced that it existed in practice in the first-century Church. But read Dodd if you haven’t. No one is clearer, and he is always terse and interesting. Essential knowledge for the educated Christian.
Lafferty’s novel requires a third category. In the first thinking-aloud post, I called that third category anamnesis. Remembering as a process and theme in the Whole Lafferty is centipedal, and Lafferty dispatches his novel to the amnesia-filled science fiction audience of Flatland 1982. If postfiguration does its job, it reawakens in the amnestic science fiction reader the knowledge that Compensation happened.
1.2. I agree with all this except the last point. I see no evidence that Aurelia’s death is sacrificial, at least if sacrifice requires willing self-offering. She doesn’t offer herself. She says it is silly!* Christ goes to the cross willingly in the New Testament after asking that the cup be taken from him. One could say that Aurelia is a sacrifice in the Old Testament sense: offered unwillingly, she dies as an animal dies. A stretch.
Postfiguration complicates this. Lafferty uses the technique a handful of times (“Ishmael into the Barrens,” “And Walk Now Gently Through the Fire,” “And Mad Undancing Bears,” “Horns on Their Heads,” etc.). Aurelia is a girl whom Lafferty subjects to postfiguration. She is not a sacrifice. That is brutally unsentimental and why I love RAL.
1.3. I agree.
1.4. I agree. One will not understand Lafferty’s own didactic intent, as distinct from Aurelia’s homilies, unless one sees that the kerygma-didache relation within Aurelia is being figured through anamnesis. The original kerygma-didache relation, whatever it was in the early Church, does not have this feature, because it witnesses typological fulfillment. It does not postfigure it but testifies to it and teaches it as a second phase process (if we want to keep Dodd’s stipulation of didache).

2.1. Lafferty says this consistently, both in the fiction and in interviews. His eudaimonism, however, is elusive, because he is, as he puts it, often rowdy-dow about happiness. Aristotle has leisure, and Aquinas has play, but neither is rowdy dow about anything. In Aristotle, the highest happiness is contemplative; in Aquinas, perfect happiness is the beatific vision, the seeing of God’s essence. A love of the rowdy-dow, where the wildness of creation is celebrated, is one of the aspects of RAL that makes him so surprising and interesting as a Catholic artist and appealing to non-Christians.
2.2. Lafferty says this, but it is a partial statement. He is not giving an outline of the Summa as a whole. Rather, he is mostly providing an outline of the Secunda Pars, with a few highly important exceptions. Many things that matter to the kerygma of Aurelia, angels, for instance, belong to other parts of the Summa and are not outlined in the homilies, but they do inform the action of the kerygma and anamnesis in the book.
2.3. The relation between imperfect and perfect happiness raises questions about man’s proportionate end, which I’ll take up in the next post on Lafferty’s primary source for the novel, Walter Farrell, O.P. Montejo no doubt understands this, but he places two thinkers with differing views in a footnote as shorthand (I assume), and the difference is worth drawing out.
2.4. I agree.

3.1. The formulas are exact chapter titles from Part II of Walter Farrell and Martin J. Healy’s My Way of Life. Part II was written by Healy. More on this in the next post.

3.2. Uncontroversial claim.
3.3. Agree, but the homilies do introduce non-Thomistic material as well as reinterpret Thomistic material. For instance, Lafferty on law is not Aquinas on law, in my view, and the cognitive/appetitive composition is more properly handled at Ia q. 16 or Ia qq. 79–82.
3.4. Agree. An educated reader will know Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s arguments about the summum bonum, so this does not explain the novel as a novel. One needs something like postfiguration unless one’s goal is simply to teach the general shape of some of Aquinas’s thought, which is what Aurelia is doing, but without the rest of the novel, you are better off with a Great Course from the Teaching Company.
The homilies do not go deep. They are far less deep than a survey in a freshman-level college course. But Lafferty is doing something else. He is staging Aurelia’s teaching. One does not sit at Aurelia’s feet and learn from her only; one watches her teach others who learn from her, if one already knows the tradition within which Lafferty is working: scripture, philosophy, and theology. Then one marvels at the defamiliarization.

4.1. Perhaps, but postfiguration complicates this. To read Aurelia simply as a Christ figure reduces her, as does seeing her as just a cruciform life. Aurelia is a character, but we are invited to think of her as a person. Christology and narrative do not consume her as St. John does the little scroll, which is relevant to Aurelia’s consumption of the seeds and antler nubs.
The novel is clearly having it both ways. Aurelia is postfigured through Christ, but she is also, in important ways, just a person, a girl who often does not know what she is doing. Montejo probably sees this “fictional fact” about her personhood, but postfiguration keeps Aurelia from being didactically consumed narratively as a golden martyr.
4.2. I agree.
4.3. I agree with Montejo’s statement, but I think it can obscure the oddness of Aurelia’s life.
A worked example.
At one point, a lecherous older man attempts the “funny uncle” routine with Aurelia, and she gives him an “instrumental knot.” To put it plainly, she ties his penis, literally or metaphorically, into a knot. No one can untie it.
Aurelia was alone on a world that she didn’t even know the name of, a young and weak girl defenseless and unarmed, without friends anywhere near, and confronted by a sanctionless and sloppy fiend. And the fiend had a hold of her, avid to force his evil will on her, with his fetid breath rattling his whole body (that was a good phrase; Aurelia had read it in a book once), and with his instrument actually barking and howling in its passion. Poor Aurelia. What could she do? She tied an Instrumental Knot in it, that’s what she did. That man Uncle Gifford made quite a noise about it when it happened to him. And he kept up the noise for some time, until the empty luxury cabin had filled up again with curious and apprehensive persons. Some persons do not know about the Instrumental Knot. They regard it as only a legend of ‘Shining World.’ Experts were sent for and flown in. “Dear girl,” said the knot expert who had been rushed in by the Navy. “Do you know how to untie this knot?” “Oh sure,” Aurelia said, “but it can’t be untied in a single day. Maybe not in a single week.”
The doctor then asks if there is a way to untie it, warning that Gifford might die. Aurelia writes down the instructions, but the doctor notices one final catch.
“Yes. A knot like that will inflict the worst pain known to man,” the doctor said. “Ah, how simply it is, now that you write it down. I’ll untie it in just a moment and have him out of his agony. But this last twist, that will still hold it, won’t it, Aurelia?” “Yes. That’s the time twist. You still can’t untie it till the time runs out.” “And when will that be, Aurelia?” asked the doctor who was the foremost constriction expert in the world. “When I leave this world, that’s when the time will be out on it. Then you will be able to untie the knot if you follow those instructions.”
This is the power of binding and loosing that Christ possesses and bestows on St. Peter in Matthew 16:19: "I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." The keys themselves show up at the end of the novel as a two-sided key that parallels the yin-yang and double dart.
As one rabbi said to another, “How do you Christianize a dick joke?”
Lafferty works the binding authority through sexual parody. The demonic parody is de-sacralized because it is anamnesis for the reader who catches the allusion, not kerygma: the reader is meant to recall the binding power of Christ, but the image has been so radically postfigured, sexualized, and made comical that one can hardly call it simply part of the cruciform shape of a Christlike life. The proclamation is not that Aurelia tied a funny uncle’s member into a knot, which is why one needs more than kerygma/didache to make sense of how Lafferty innovates literary form. Postfigural distance lets him burlesque sacred scripture without disrespecting it.
4.4. “Required” is too strong, and finally not explanatory. What is the force of the requirement? I understand what Montejo is saying, and in one sense I agree with him. But if Aurelia is to be read as a novel that can be discussed paragraph by paragraph, one needs considerably more. One needs a tool like postfiguration. One needs both proclamation and reclamation. This objection is significant, though it goes beyond the remit Montejo sets for himself.

5.1. I find this uncontroversial.
5.2. I find this uncontroversial as well.
5.3. The Mystery of Iniquity is not merely sin, but apocalypse (2 Thessalonians 2).
5.4. I agree, though the relation between sin and eudaimonism in Aurelia needs closer examination. It is a major problem in Thomism, and it bears on the larger question of whether a Thomistic ethics, as distinct from a Thomistic theology, is possible at all. How one reads the homilies in Aurelia turns on how one understands the duplex beatitudo. Can a secular reader take the homilies as a freestanding ethics of happiness, ordered to man’s natural/proportionate end? Or must they finally be received as irreducible theology, as in Aurelia’s claim that each person is an arc?
“It is because I can’t make you understand your present position and composite that I can’t make you understand your choices, though it seems so easy to choose the excellent over the execrable. A living and bodied person is a sort of arc of a circle, or perhaps of a parabola. If we continue the lines of that arc out beyond the body and the person, we come to a puzzle. The lines cannot be completed in the person’s own world or context. They go over the edge. Part of the enclosed, extended person will be either ultra-natural or infra-natural—anyhow it will be in another world, beyond the bounds of its supposed nature. We are sometimes told to become whole persons, and so we must do. But our own life and world are too small to contain our whole personhood.”
The dispute over a purely philosophical Thomistic ethics turns on whether an autonomous moral philosophy can be abstracted from Aquinas’s theology without distorting his thought. On one side are figures such as Jacques Maritain and Denis Bradley, who argue that a purely philosophical, Aristotelian-style ethics is incompatible with Aquinas’s deepest theological commitments.
On this view, such an ethics depends on a natural end, eudaimonia, achievable through autonomous human action; but Aquinas holds that humanity’s only true ultimate end is the supernatural beatific vision, and that the fallen human will requires divine grace to achieve the fullness of moral goodness. It is curious, then, how little Lafferty says about the beatific vision.
On the other side, defenders of an autonomous Thomistic ethics, such as Ralph McInerny, Wolfgang Kluxen, and new-natural-law theorists like John Finnis, argue that it is both possible and necessary to extract from Aquinas a valid this-worldly moral philosophy. They hold that Aquinas’s accounts of imperfect natural beatitude, natural inclinations, and the first principles of practical reason provide a coherent, universally accessible ethical foundation that does not require theological commitment or dependence on revealed doctrine.
My own view belongs with the first camp. It is also where one finds Walter Farrell, Lafferty’s source, and the subject of the next post. Lafferty, oblique as always, does not spell out his answer to this question because he wants to awaken the reader, not preach and teach. Aurelia herself preaches and teaches, another reason to treat the kerygma/didache distinction as analytic, not metafictionally actual.
The old guys said, concedo, distinguo, nego, addo for a clearer picture.
*Complicated by the fact that silly is also a Scots word and Aurelia is punning on it as she dies next to the Scottishly named Cousin Clootie.
Bibliographical Note
Lafferty’s work-history card for Aurelia, also headed To Aurelia, with Horns, gives a manuscript extent of 194 pages and 70,000 words. It records submission to Virginia Kidd on October 20, 1976, followed by a note about retyping a lost manuscript and a further entry to Kidd on November 17, 1976.
First published as Aurelia by The Donning Company in its Starblaze Editions series in September 1982, with illustrations by Larry Todd. The first edition has 183 pages.
Sources: R. A. Lafferty, work-history card for Aurelia / To Aurelia, with Horns, R. A. Lafferty papers, 1979-002, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa; Internet Speculative Fiction Database, Aurelia, title record, https://www.isfdb.org/cgi-bin/title.cgi?2397, and first-edition record, https://www.isfdb.org/cgi-bin/pl.cgi?189529.


