top of page
Search

"Camels and Dromedaries, Clem" (1967)

Sep 19, 2025
7 min read

Updated: 2 days ago

Side-by-side images of a one-humped dromedary and a two-humped camel.

“Is there an anti-Christ — the man who fled naked from the garden at dusk leaving his garment behind? We know that both do not keep the garment at the moment of sundering.”

I’ve been thinking about “Camels and Dromedaries, Clem,” one of my favorite Lafferty stories. Daniel Otto Jack Petersen considers it alongside “Splinters.” He hears the distress of the marriage in the pairs of creatures Veronica and the Clems name. For him, the men share their incompleteness with the animals. I want to ask what happens if we read the story’s events as an attack on their own premise.


I read “Camels and Dromedaries, Clem” as a thought experiment about what happens when we try to get around onto-theology. Lafferty keeps coming back to the schizo-gash. I read it as a wound of the Fall in a person made in the image of the Trinity. For me, “Camels” is a metaphysical horror story that undermines its own premise and laughs at it, most memorably in the image of Veronica’s two headstones.


Clem Clendenning, a successful traveling salesman, splits in two. When he phones his hotel to check his registration, he recognizes the voice that answers and even his own way of lying. The Clem in the room knows him by his frightened breathing. The caller flees into a solitary, compromised existence, taking up an “avocation of drinking and brooding and waiting” in places like the Two-Faced Bar and Grill. The other Clem keeps his job and lives with Veronica.


Veronica suspected the division from the first. Several years later, Joe Zabotsky arranges for her to meet the Clem who fled. Back at her hotel, the other Clem interrupts their embrace. “You can’t be jealous of each other. You’re the same man.” She proposes that all three go home together. When one Clem objects, she tells the men to put themselves back together.


Veronica gives them a month to lose a hundred pounds apiece. Both say it would kill them. “There is another way,” says one Clem, startling Veronica and the other Clem. He asks her to gain a hundred pounds and divide. She agrees to try. She gains the weight within the month and dies. The Clems pay her a “special honor” in the last lines. “They sat two headstones on her grave. One of them said ‘Veronica.’ And the other one said ‘Veronica.’ She’d have liked that.”


My interpretation begins with the theological implications of doubling Christ. The first stranger at the bar asks why Matthew has two demoniacs and, at Jericho, two blind men where Mark and Luke have one. He also cites Matthew’s other healing of two blind men (9:27–31), which has no direct parallel. The stranger suspects that Matthew himself was sundered. I read this as an instance of the devil quoting Scripture. The man recruits the Gospel to justify his own division. A second stranger, whose other self is a dean, takes the argument further. He asks whether God underwent a sundering. It is this man who asks in the epigraph whether the young man who fled naked in Mark 14:51–52 was an anti-Christ.


Derek Parfit’s account of personal identity provides a useful comparison.


Parfit’s thought experiments ask whether what matters in survival must depend on remaining numerically the same person.


Reasons and Persons (1984) develops that argument. I disagree with its conclusion about the importance of identity, and I think Lafferty’s story gives form to an objection.


To define a few terms here, personal identity is what makes a person the same unique individual through the various changes they experience over a lifetime. Reductionism is an account of this identity: the view that it is not a separate, deep fact (like a soul) but consists in physical and/or psychological continuity, with the relevant conditions for persistence.


Identity and continuity


  • The Non-Reductionist View: Personal identity involves a further fact, not exhausted by physical and psychological relations. On the version considered here, a person’s continued existence is determinate and all-or-nothing.

  • The Reductionist View: The fact of a person’s identity is not a further fact. In Parfit’s psychological account, it consists in Relation R—psychological connectedness and/or continuity with an appropriate cause—holding without branching.

  • Parfit's Claim: Personal identity is not what matters for survival. What matters is Relation R. In symmetrical fission, neither successor is the original person, but what matters in survival continues.


The distinction becomes clear in a case of symmetrical fission:

Identity and symmetrical fission, panel 1 of 2.

Identity and symmetrical fission, panel 2 of 2.

The split also raises a question for a Catholic reading of the human person. One possible story would explain the double as a tempter or impostor, leaving the original person’s unity intact. Lafferty chooses a more disturbing course: both Clems retain claims on the life that has divided.


The Catholic account of the person as a unity of body and spiritual soul supplies my point of comparison (Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§362–366). It does not prescribe the plot a Catholic novelist must write. A fictional division can test the consequences of a premise without asserting it as doctrine.


Imagine, for example, a version in which the other Clem is a malevolent being sent to tempt him into despair. Clem’s task would be to recognize and reject the deception.


Another imagined version might make the double an artificial imitation whose makers claim more for it than they have achieved. That plot would have to establish the imitation’s nature within the fiction; Catholic doctrine alone would not settle whether it was a person. Past Master offers a related problem in the Programmed Persons’ account of their makers and Astrobe’s secret masters.


A third path would be to treat the split as just an allegory. One Clem would personify Clem's sinful nature, and the conflict would be internal, with the goal being repentance and the integration of the true self with God's will, rather than the physical merging of two bodies. Lafferty hints at this, but he doesn’t want the reader to go entirely in this direction. I think we can see that because the Clem who fled is arguably the lesser of the two, and he is pretty damn sympathetic.

The alternative below is one invented plot for comparison, not a prescription for Catholic fiction.

Two possible treatments of the double, panel 1 of 2.

Two possible treatments of the double, panel 2 of 2.

These alternative plots would let the protagonist work toward a recovered unity. “Camels” refuses that reassurance: neither Clem can simply dismiss the other’s claim.


I read the resulting horror as a theological reductio of a position resembling Parfit’s later reductionism. Lafferty’s Catholic commitments help explain my reading, but the evidence has to come from what division does to Clem and Veronica.


Clem Clendenning’s split resembles symmetrical fission, though the two Clems soon diverge. Their overlapping lives also recall Parfit’s “Branch-Line Case,” in which an original remains alive alongside a replica. That case does not by itself imply that the original has lost his identity. The fission comparison raises the prospect of survival without identity, which Lafferty presents as both amusing and terrifying. Parfit imagines what division would mean for the woman who loved the man before he divided. She could love both successors. Neither could have the undivided attention she once gave him. Parfit asks what the two men would lose (§90, pp. 263–64). Lafferty lets us hear what the wife wants. She wants the men to put themselves back together.


Joe tells the Clem in New York that his face is getting fuller and the other Clem’s thinner. As for their memories, each can recall things the other cannot. Joe says, “There are some old things between us that he recalls and you don’t; there are some that you recall and he doesn’t; and dammit there are some that you both recall, and they happened between myself and one man only, not between myself and two men.”


In a perfectly symmetrical fission case, Parfit would reject the demand for a further fact selecting the real successor. Clem’s question, "If he’s me, I wonder who I am?", approaches that problem, though the story leaves the symmetry of his division uncertain.


My Catholic reading takes the unity of the person as the standard against which this division becomes horrific. Lafferty’s schizo-gash characters can embody a fractured human experience without committing him to a doctrine of divided souls. The question is what the story makes of living in that condition.


Clem suspects that other sundered people come to the Two-Faced Bar and Grill. The young-old man tells him about his double. I read the community Clem imagines as a hell of fragmented beings. The young-old man’s suggestion that God himself came apart gives us the theological impossibility of a divided Trinity.


Secular reason, represented by the analyst who tells Clem he is suffering from a "tmema or diairetikos of an oddly named part of his psychic apparatus," offers a comically inadequate explanation for this terror.


I hear the demand for personal unity most strongly in Veronica’s insistence that the men reunite. Yet she also joins the fatal attempt to divide herself. The two headstones give us the final, cruel joke. They bear the same name, though one Clem grieves more keenly. The other has already lived without her for years.


For me, Veronica’s death is the decisive objection. The division that the Clems learn to accommodate becomes fatal when they try to make her share it.


Argument chart comparing reductionist and Catholic views of identity in Camels and Dromedaries, Clem.

Plot flowchart following the two Clems, Joe’s arrangement for Veronica to meet the man who fled, and the fatal attempt to divide her.
Diagram comparing reductionist and non-reductionist interpretations of Clem’s division.
The essay’s Catholic reading of the story, beginning with the memories shared between the two Clems.
The two Clems and Veronica, from separation to the proposal that she divide and the unequal grief at her death.
The Clems’ overlapping memories, gradual change in their faces, and unequal grief at Veronica’s death.
Table of narrative devices, including Clem’s suspicion that other sundered people gather at the Two-Faced Bar and Grill.
Five responses to the two Clems’ predicament, including the proposed trial exchange and the refusal of the Clem who fled.
The caller recognizes his own voice. The answering Clem recognizes his frightened breathing. Joe checks the story and arranges the meeting with Veronica.



Bibliographical Note


Lafferty’s work-history card dates the writing to February 4, 1967. He sent the story to Frederik Pohl, revised it on March 12, and sent it that day to Damon Knight. After Knight returned it, Lafferty submitted it to The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction on March 28. He revised and resubmitted it on May 21. The card records a sale for $85 on June 6.


First published in The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction 33, no. 4 (October 1967), 47–57. The headstone passage is quoted from p. 57 of this printing.


Sources: R. A. Lafferty, work-history card for “Camels and Dromedaries, Clem,” R. A. Lafferty papers, 1979-002, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa; Internet Speculative Fiction Database, “Camels and Dromedaries, Clem,” https://www.isfdb.org/cgi-bin/title.cgi?53866.

bottom of page