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Ip Consensus Realities and Prime

Sep 7, 2025
7 min read

Updated: 5 days ago

Natural-history illustration of three squirrels perched on a fallen branch.
Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find everyone engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel—a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: does the man go round the squirrel or not? He goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Everyone had taken sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Each side, when I appeared, therefore appealed to me to make it a majority. Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and found one, as follows: "Which party is right," I said, "depends on what you practically mean by 'going round' the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther dispute. You are both right and both wrong according as you conceive the verb 'to go round' in one practical fashion or the other." —William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” lecture II of Pragmatism (1907)

You seem to posit a real world, but that is doubtful. There isn't any reality except various consensus realities. And no two persons belong to quite the same consensus. So the world that a person lives in is largely a world that he has fictionized, whether he is a fictioner by trade or not. Whatever frustrations we find in the cantankerous combo-world is partly from our own inability to shape things just the way we want to. —R. A. Lafferty, interview with Robert J. Whitaker, At the Sleepy Sailor (1979), p. 18

I’m fascinated by the philosophical problem of underdetermination. The philosophers who most interest me try to tackle it, and it’s one of the reasons Lafferty fascinates me. Lafferty has been seen as a post-modernist, or a post-post-modernist, but neither of those is a category that I use when trying to work through interpretative questions. Partly this is the old joke that from the modernism you choose, you get the postmodernism you deserve.


More seriously, those categories invite petitio principii. You set up a problem where the historical has already won and become absolute or has been vaporized into nihilism, something Leo Strauss understood in Natural Right and History (1953), when he saw that without a transhistorical standard of reason, historicism collapses into nihilism. Pick one or the other, says modernity.


I think this matters for Lafferty because (a) he wants to transcend the historical, (b) he rejects nihilism ("Flatland," "the trashed-life premise," "heroic tedium," etc.), and (c) he intensifies the problem of underdetermination. Consider what Lafferty says to Sirignano. We inhabit a “cantankerous combo-world” stitched from overlapping consensus realities, and he denies a “real world” outside those consensuses. Now consider the many essays that affirm a mind-independent World grounded in God, the "Real World" to which fiction and life ultimately answer. His defense of didactic fiction also insists that stories teach. He wrote to Sheryl Smith, "What's this stuff about art not supposed to be didactic? I buy you geography and arithmetic books and you chew them up and don't learn what's in them. Then I put the stuff in SF parables, and you say it's fine but it doesn't teach anything. Sure it's supposeta. SF is the literature of ideas. Its whole idea is to serve as a shoe-horn to get ideas into funny-shaped head."


Both the cantankerous-combo worlds and the Real World coexist in his work (Lafferty's use of Worlds).


In the venerable tradition of getting rid of a contradiction with a distinction, here are some possibilities.


Diagram posing the apparent tension between multiple consensus worlds and one mind-independent PRIME reality.

Assumptions:


(a) a real created order independent of human minds exists;

(b) reason can know some truths about God from creation;

(c) revelation is binding and truth is one (no “true for me” vs “true absolutely”).


  1. Level distinction (phenomenology vs. metaphysics):


    P1: Human experience is always mediated by consensus (“worlds we fictionalize”).


    P2: Mediation doesn’t entail non-existence of a mind-independent reality.


    ∴ The quote speaks of how we encounter; PRIME states what ultimately is.


    This distinguishes how we experience from what exists.


  2. Epistemic fallibilism + ontological realism.


    P1: Our knowledge is theory/consensus-laden and underdetermined.


    P2: A real, independent World exists (PRIME).


    ∴ We’re fallible knowers of a real World; both claims stand.


    This treats us as fallible knowers of a real world.


  3. Domain restriction (social vs. cosmic).


    P1: “Realities” can designate socially constructed orders (law, money, norms).


    P2: Catholic metaphysics concerns creation’s being under God.


    ∴ Social worlds are plural; creation/PRIME is singular.


    This situates many social worlds inside one created order.


  4. Analogical predication of “world.”


    P1: “World” can mean experiential lifeworld; also the total created order.


    P2: Catholicism uses analogical language for being.


    ∴ “World” need not name the same thing in both claims.


    This compares the senses in which “world” is being used.


  5. Appearance and reality.


    P1: Experienced reality is mediated by perception and shared conceptual schemes.


    P2: PRIME is the God-grounded order independent of human minds.


    ∴ Two standpoints, no contradiction.


    This distinguishes appearances from the reality they disclose without exhausting it.


  6. Thomistic participation.


    P1: Created things participate in Being (ipsum esse subsistens as source).


    P2: Human minds “form” secondary worlds by intention/language.


    ∴ Consensus worlds are human constructions within the created order (PRIME).


    This explains created being as participation in the act of Being.


  7. Sacramental mediation.


    P1: Signs and rituals constitute shared consensus spaces.


    P2: Sacraments confer the grace they signify.


    ∴ Plural mediations don’t negate the unity and objectivity of PRIME.


    This acknowledges multiple mediations while preserving one reality of grace.


  8. Eschatological unveiling (now/not-yet).


    P1: In history, appearances are fractured by competing consensuses.


    P2: At the eschaton, reality (PRIME) is fully disclosed.


    ∴ Partial knowledge now and fuller disclosure later concern the same reality.


    This distinguishes present knowledge from eschatological disclosure.


  9. Peircean convergence, adapted.


    P1: Truth is what inquiry would converge on under ideal communal conditions.


    P2: Revelation/deposit orients that convergence toward PRIME.


    ∴ Present consensuses are partial; inquiry aims at truth about PRIME.


    This treats communal convergence as an aid to truth rather than a replacement for correspondence and revelation.


  10. Hinge realism.


    P1: Doubt and inquiry depend on commitments held fixed within a practice.


    P2: Catholic commitments answer to reality (PRIME).


    ∴ Framework plurality + ontological accountability cohere.


    This locates reasoning within frameworks that reality and revelation can correct.


  11. Two-city analogy (Augustinian).


    P1: Augustine’s two cities are formed by self-love set against God and by love of God.


    P2: Their citizens are intermingled in history, though their ultimate ends differ.


    ∴ A shared historical world can contain opposed spiritual allegiances.


    This locates the division in human loves and ends within one real world.


  12. Contextual scope and objective truth.


    P1: “Reality” can be restricted to our experienced world in one context.


    P2: “PRIME” names the mind-independent order in another.


    ∴ The claims can differ in scope while answering to one truth.


    This tests the scope of each claim while maintaining the unity of truth.


  13. Divine exemplars (Augustinian).


    P1: God creates things according to the ideas in his intellect.


    P2: Human consensuses are finite, fallible representations of created reality.


    ∴ PRIME depends on God while existing independently of human minds.


    This grounds created intelligibility in God while affirming real creatures.


  14. Divine creation and human form-giving.


    P1: Consensus gives cultural form to our interpretations of experience.


    P2: God is the efficient, exemplar, and final cause of the created order (PRIME).


    ∴ Human interpretation presupposes the created order it interprets.


    This distinguishes cultural form-giving from God’s causation of being.


  15. Underdetermination + revelation as tie-breaker.


    P1: Multiple conceptual schemes fit the same data (underdetermination).


    P2: Revelation/deposit provides non-empirical constraints fixing metaphysical commitment to PRIME.


    ∴ Many consensus worlds; one binding metaphysical anchor.


    This allows many live theories while letting revelation decisively orient fundamentals.


  16. Rhetorical/ironic persona (literary–philosophical).


    P1: Lafferty sometimes stages voices to dramatize positions.


    P2: A staged phenomenological claim can coexist with a personal realist confession.


    ∴ The two utterances could function at different rhetorical levels.


    This reading turns on irony or an adopted voice in the interview.


  17. Participatory ontology of truth.


    P1: Humans co-make “worlds” responsibly or irresponsibly.


    P2: Truth is the conformity of intellect to reality (PRIME).


    ∴ World-making is judged by, and can align with, PRIME.


    This understands truth as the intellect’s conformity to reality within moral responsibility.


  18. Apophatic limits.


    P1: Our speech about the World is analogical and limited (cantankerousness = limits).


    P2: The deposit of faith asserts real truths while acknowledging divine incomprehensibility.


    ∴ Plural consensuses reflect finitude; PRIME is affirmed through limited human concepts.


    This affirms true claims while acknowledging divine incomprehensibility.


  19. Double-coding of “fictionalization.”


    P1: “Fictionalize” can mean selecting and composing from facts.


    P2: Composition presupposes a field of facts grounded in PRIME.


    ∴ On this reading, fictionalization reshapes our account of reality.


    This treats fictionalization as selection and composition that presuppose real facts.


  20. Moral realism with descriptive pluralism.


    P1: Descriptions of the world vary by consensus (pluralism).


    P2: Moral/metaphysical facts (Good/God/ends) are objective.


    ∴ Plural descriptions under a single moral-metaphysical order.


    This admits many descriptions while upholding an objective moral order.


Container model placing social and experiential worlds within the larger created world.
Perspective model showing observers approaching one reality through different cultural and conceptual lenses.
Present partial knowledge and eschatological disclosure concern the same PRIME reality.
God causes the created order, within which consensus and culture shape interpretation of human experience.

 

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