“Condillac's Statue” (1968/1970)
Updated: 2 days ago

While thinking about Past Master (1968), I returned to Lafferty’s short story "Condillac’s Statue or Wrens in His Head." It offers another take on how to construct a Programmed Person.
In the story, the philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714–1780) creates a statue out of frog-colored granite on his estate near Beaugency. The occult doctor Jouhandeau helps him enliven this statue—“Old Rock” or “Rock-Head”—through successive connections: smell, hearing, sight, and speech. The experiment is meant to prove that there are no innate ideas. Condillac’s Traité des sensations (1754) derives both ideas and mental faculties from sensation, departing from John Locke’s account of reflection. Locke conceptualized reflection as an independent source of ideas alongside sensation. Condillac argued that reflection is derivative of sensation.
But the statue, observing and talking to travelers, children, and revolutionaries, begins to form its own thoughts and allegiances. Caught between its property—a sack of gold hidden in its head (Lafferty’s satire of Condillac’s Le Commerce et le gouvernement considérés relativement l’un à l’autre (1776))—and a band of revolutionaries, its brain and senses are killed, though the stone statue survives. The story’s ending circles back to Jouhandeau’s earlier claim: that he is more than two hundred years ahead of his time. In the future, there will be blood-soaked revolutions that follow his pattern.
It’s a very smart story, and there is much in it that deepens one’s understanding of Chapter 10 of Past Master. The mysterious material that Jouhandeau adds to the head of Condillac’s statue parallels what the Programmed Persons say about the creation of the first of their kind. There are interesting verbal overlaps as well. Take, for instance, these lines from the occultist Jouhandeau and the Programmed Person Pottscamp:
“I do not believe that there are any innate concepts either. I do not believe that there are any concepts of any sort, anywhere, ever.”
“Of course we aren't, Thomas. We are machines. How would we be conscious? But we believe that men are not conscious either, that there is no such thing as consciousness. It is an illusion in counting, a feeling that one is two. It is a word without real meaning.”
Lafferty uses “ideologies” in “In Deepest Glass” and “ideological” in “The Forty-Seventh Island.” On the whole, I doubt he would have had much patience for ideology; the philosophical assumptions behind the concept likely irritated him. His stance on language and meaning, particularly in his sacramental poesis, resists the notion that thought is reducible to ideology. Lafferty demonstrates a deep aversion to the assumption that all thought is ideological rather than incomplete, mistaken, or confused.
“Ideology” (idéologie) was coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in the late 18th century during the French Revolution. It was to be the "science of ideas," grounded in empiricism and sensationalist epistemology, inspired by Condillac’s Traité des sensations, where the central thought experiment is Condillac’s statue itself. If this is of interest, read the Condillac entry in The Catholic Encyclopedia (1907–1912). (I would put money on Lafferty having consulted it while writing the story, likely alongside his copy of Copleston.)
The original Idéologues, influenced by Condillac’s empirical philosophy, wanted to apply rational analysis to human thought, education, and governance in the name of secularism, scientific progress, and constitutional principles. Their ideas gained credibility through figures like Antoine Lavoisier, who, by 1777, had developed an oxygen-based theory of combustion. His work helped displace the phlogiston theory and laid the groundwork for modern chemistry. Lavoisier drew on Condillac's method of analysis in developing a systematic chemical nomenclature with his collaborators.
The Idéologues saw feats like this as scientific vindication: if Condillac was right, and language could be used to map rationality itself, then those most adept at language—lawyers, rhetoricians, Enlightenment intellectuals—had a justification for their own intellectual authority alongside men of scientific genius like Lavoisier.
In the wake of the Thermidorian reaction (1794), several Idéologues supported Napoleon’s coup of 18 Brumaire (1799). He later turned idéologie into a pejorative, mocking their abstract theorizing, detached from political pragmatism. By the mid-19th century, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) redefined ideology as a system of ideas that reinforced social and economic power structures. Marx held that social existence shapes consciousness and that conflict between productive forces and existing relations of production can bring about social revolution. 'Between equal rights force decides,' he wrote in Das Kapital, vol. 1 (1867), in his discussion of the struggle over the length of the working day.
This account of thought and social change contrasts with Lafferty’s world, where thought is shaped by something beyond rationally reconstructed structures or political and economic forces.
Lafferty’s subtitle points to what he is up to in "Condillac’s Statue." The wrens are what I have called the supernatural remainder, the thing that cannot be explained away. This goes deep into Lafferty’s treatment of animals in his fiction and how it relates to human fallenness. He writes in 'Riddle-Writers of the Isthmus' (1980):
The idea of a humanity both taller and deeper and more inclusive than now, of the time when animals were somehow contained in mankind . . . .
Condillac and Jouhandeau cannot exert control over them. “Wrens in my head, they say of me,” Rock-Head says, not just harboring them but identifying with them in one of the most memorable moments in the story:
“Wrens in my head, they say of me. It's a country expression, Condillac. Besides, I have them literally, quite a pleasant family of them inside my stone head. Learn from the wren wisdom!” Condillac angrily beat on the lower part of the statue with his leaded cane, breaking off toes. “I will not be lectured by a rock!” he crackled. “You have not these ideas originally, and mature brain matter will reject such. Therefore, you have them not! Reason is the thing, Statue, rationality. We promulgate it. It spreads. It prevails. The tomorrow world will be the world of total reason.”
Lafferty’s animal analogue (the idea that the lion can no longer lie down with the lamb after the Fall and therefore something fundamental has shifted in the animal part of man) is one of his major themes. It recurs throughout his fiction and thought, and his distinctive treatment of it sets him apart from nearly every other writer.
With "Condillac’s Statue" and the Programmed Persons in mind, this is what I call zoon anthropikon: “the human-animal” and “the animalistic human.” This Laffertian principle holds that animals exist within human consciousness, intimating what humanity has lost—or what it might yet become.








(Marcel Jouhandeau (1888-1979) comes in for a savaging in “Condillac’s Statue.” In Notes sur la magie et le vol (1952, p. 13), Jouhandeau wrote, “In 1927-1928 I was very much taken up with magic and occultism.” These are always fun moments in Lafferty.)
Bibliographical Note
Completed February 4, 1968. First published as “Condillac’s Statue, or Wrens in His Head” in Alchemy and Academe, edited by Anne McCaffrey (Doubleday, 1970).
Lafferty’s work-history card records submission to Damon Knight on February 4, 1968, return on February 23, and submission to Virginia Kidd on April 20. An undated entry records the sale to Anne McCaffrey for Alchemy and Academe.
Sources: R. A. Lafferty, work-history card for “Condillac’s Statue,” R. A. Lafferty papers, 1979-002, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa. “Alchemy and Academe,” Internet Speculative Fiction Database, accessed October 24, 2026, https://isfdb.org/cgi-bin/pl.cgi?1910=.


