IIa. The Three Armageddons of Enniscorthy Sweeny
Updated: 2 days ago

“People are easily fooled. But there are tests for reality. If a thing is burned up, then there will be a residue of ashes and gasses. But if there is not such a residue, and the things appears to be unchanged, then it is not acting as if it were burned up.” — The Three Armageddons of Enniscorthy Sweeny, p. 357
“But if indeed six million Jews were killed (between a third and a half of the Jews in the World, and more Jews than were in the maximum area ever controlled by the Germans) then they should have left a big hole in the total Jewish World Population; but they didn’t.” — Lafferty, Letter to Dan Knight, January 24, 1990
The Three Armageddons of Enniscorthy Sweeny is one of Lafferty’s major works, and if he ever receives the scholarly attention he deserves, it will be studied closely. There is far more to the book than its homologies to the paralogical fantasies of Holocaust denial. Still, the book cannot be adequately understood until that issue is addressed. This essay traces those parallels through Lafferty’s treatment of historical evidence and memory.
The Three Armageddons of Enniscorthy Sweeny is a complicated book. Enniscorthy Sweeny claims that his opera, Armageddon II, of a devastating conflict, World-Wide War Two, can prevent it from ever having happened. Other voices accuse his art of bringing catastrophe into being. By trying to trap the catastrophe within an art form, in a world where billions believe that such wars simply did not occur, he generates a vast, pervasive ambiguity about the war’s reality. This provides a context for considering its inverse: what Lafferty saw as the creation of the Jewish Holocaust: an artistic (propagandistic) fabrication of an “Armageddon” that most people believe did happen, but which Lafferty denied.
In his dissertation, Glyn Morgan remarks that "almost the only thing which is certain about 'The Three Armageddons of Enniscorthy Sweeny' is that it is the story of its titular character." Morgan goes on to offer a reading of trauma and historical memory. His account of collective responsibility for the Holocaust needs to be considered alongside Lafferty’s denial that the genocide occurred. The parallels can be considered through the concept of family resemblance.
Lafferty’s novel creates a world in which wars and genocides become variants that never cohere into settled public facts. Archives and testimony are downgraded to a secondary status. Canons of the historical method are displaced by a behavioral litmus test (“if it had happened, people would act differently”). Records become games, maneuvers, or bureaucratic residues. Holocaust imagery, including that of ovens and cremation, appears as present-tense spectacle. At the same time, Jewish victims are transfigured into allegory, and Hitler is cataloged mainly as an artist within the chronology.
The cumulative effect is to reproduce within the fiction strategies that real-world denial employs to make twentieth-century atrocities, including the Holocaust, disappear. One of the most important sections in this regard is 10.2: “A Square-Headed Answer” by Brig. General George Dredgefellow, in the Deactivated Army Review, June, 1970, which is worth rereading for any Lafferty fan. The parenthetical exchange at the end of the article challenges Dredgefellow’s test and concedes that “maybe the wars and aftermaths did happen” (358). The same test fails amid burning bodies in 9.2 and returns in the final paragraph, when the world ends without the response its destruction ought to provoke (11.4). My reading concerns the resemblance between these methods of denial and Lafferty’s own, including where the fiction exposes their failure.
An ironic reading that excludes Lafferty’s religious convictions and the evidence of his Holocaust denial practices what I call secular quarantine.
The novel plainly exposes the absurdity of denying the wars. That does not settle how its treatment of denial relates to Lafferty’s own Holocaust denial.
In my reading, the book is a masterclass in ideological self-sabotage, showing how one can construct a gnostic world of falsified history by carefully deploying its strategies. In other words, Lafferty shoots himself in the foot.
The key to this reading is the deep-seated paranoia inherent in denialism; it operates through projection. The tactics the narrative embodies (downgrading evidence, shifting burdens of proof, reframing archives) are the same ones real-world denialists accuse mainstream historians of using to manufacture the Jewish Holocaust, but that they themselves use. Lafferty, then, is not just being ironic, though irony is the dominant mode. Just as real events can be erased, false ones can be manufactured. That is the bridge between the fictionally gnostic Enniscorthy Sweeny and the Holocaust-denying Lafferty.

The following twelve passages develop these comparisons:

“Second-class evidence . . . minority reports . . . Newspaper . . . army records . . . survivor pensions . . . nine million affidavits . . . My own memories” (354–355)
This re-labels the entire documentary record as inherently weaker.
Denialist homology: Downgrading evidence. Actual archives and witness memory are downgraded so they can be set aside.
“Some of the evidence is very convincing . . . there are ways to bury it . . . the very lack of popular interest in these wars and degradations indicates that they are not valid.” (356)
This grants strength, then nullifies it by appeal to public indifference.
Denialist homology: Appeal to public indifference. In other words, if the crowd doesn’t care, it didn’t happen.
“If a thing is burned up . . . people of the world do not act as if there had been wars . . . That is the test.” (357)
This substitutes a behavior test for historical method.
Denialist homology: Shifting the burden of proof. Demand a change in public behavior as proof; when it is absent, deny the events.
“So, on all counts, we come down to the straight hard-headed answer: the wars did not happen.” (358)
Dredgefellow reaches this verdict after dismissing the evidence.
Denialist homology: Categorical denial after dismissing contrary evidence.
“The names of the five hundred battles . . . But those were only the names of army games and maneuvers. I named some of them myself.” (356)
This reinterprets battle records as titles for games.
Denialist homology: Reclassifying historical records as evidence of games or hoaxes.
Lists WWI sites, then: “why is there pretense that the battles were real?” (279)
Sweeny questions whether the named battles occurred.
Denialist homology: This is motivated incredulity posing as critique.
“Nothing of the Armageddon Variant is given . . . it does not appear anywhere as facts or events . . . They are not removed. They simply are not available to be put in.” (281)
This builds erasure into the ‘history’ section itself.
Denialist homology: Excluding events from the historical record.
Chronology item: “‘The Brown Danube,’ Oil Painting, A. Hitler. Hung in Alte Pinakothek, Munich.” (285)
This recasts Hitler principally as an artist in the official timeline.
Proposed parallel: Deflection and normalization. It minimizes the importance of a principal perpetrator.
“To the second of the beasts they offered the flesh of Gypsies and Jews.” (355)
Dredgefellow reports the psychologists’ account of Jewish and Roma victims through an apocalyptic bestiary.
Proposed parallel: Mythic displacement. In the fiction, allegory depicts their slaughter; in the letter, Lafferty uses it to deny the genocide.
“Assassinations and Group Exterminations were always on TV” . . . “permits to live beyond fifty” . . . “consensus leaders.” (370–371)
Mass killing becomes televised spectacle; survival beyond fifty requires a permit.
Related mechanism: Making violence routine through spectacle.
“There were furnaces on every corner . . . the stronger of them would throw the weaker in to their deaths . . . ‘Let’s decide this at the Furnace’s Mouth’” (371)
This shifts cremation imagery into street sport during the final war.
Denialist homology: Displacement of atrocity imagery. In this reading, moving the furnaces into the final war helps detach them from the Holocaust.
“We lived those war games . . . they seemed to be more than games . . . paper army.” (357–358)
Here, experience is admitted, then reclassified as game.
Denialist homology: Dismissing remembered experience as a game.


