Ghostliness in the Ghost Story
Updated: Nov 8

It seemed, until I thought of it a bit, that I had written quite a few novels, and many shorter works, and also verses and scraps. Now I understood by some sort of intuition that what I had been writing was a never-ending story and that the name of it was “A Ghost Story.” The name comes from the only thing that I have learned about all people: that they are ghostly, and that they are sometimes split-off. But no one can ever know for sure which part of the split is himself.
Daniel Otto Jack Petersen let me read “Good Weather for Gory Doppelgängers: Ecomonstrous Doubles, Eidolons, and Fetches in Three Tales by R. A. Lafferty” before publication. It has since appeared in Uncanny Doubles, pp. 233–250. The essay brings Swarbrick’s account of incompleteness to three of Lafferty’s stories.
Petersen builds on Steven Swarbrick's arguments in The Environmental Unconscious (2023) that early-modern poetry (and this goes for material life as well) is "pierced by lack," a Lucretian minus that at once wounds and energizes ecological desire. Adopting that premise, he argues that R. A. Lafferty's doppelgängers demonstrate how the same void shapes contemporary fiction.
For Petersen, Lacan's Real, re-read through Lucretius, acts like this:

The bold step is identifying the Lacanian Real itself with this minus of the Lucretian void; that identification lets him treat Lafferty's doubles, fetches, and splits not as mere negations but as "shadowy subtractions of the Real," sub-material holes that make meaning possible by exposing its limits and granting "the jouissance of more truly un-centring ourselves in the radically open-ended semiosis and asemiosis of planetary existence."
Petersen carries Swarbrick’s account from Renaissance verse into Lafferty’s fiction, where doubles expose limits in what people can know and say about their world.

His attention to weather, animals, and damaged landscapes makes the doubles part of their surroundings, rather than isolated problems of personal identity.
That approach offers a useful reading of “Camels and Dromedaries, Clem,” “Splinters,” and “Cabrito.” My disagreement concerns what happens when lack becomes the governing account of Lafferty’s ghostliness.
The essay also sent me back to Lafferty’s Ghost Story statement. Petersen and I both take the relation between a person and the surrounding world seriously, but we differ about the nature of that relation. Here is
the alternative
.
It is such a big question that, a while back, I started keeping a little notebook to understand what Lafferty means by "ghost." Why does he use that word, along with all the doublets and variations his readers will recognize, from spooks to fetches and back again?
My view is that Lafferty chose the word "ghost" because he wanted to discuss the spiritual realm without being sententious. He did this well, especially considering how unlikely most readers are to equate "ghost" with "spiritual" in his well-known lines about what he was doing. You might ask, "If that's what he meant, why not say so?"
There are likely many reasons. One, I think, is this: he used "ghost" because it generated the kinds of stories he liked to spin. And because he believed most modern people had suffered a type of amnesia. They no longer understood the word "spiritual." But they still had just enough left in them to recognize a ghost.
I would paraphrase the statement this way, substituting spiritual language for its ghosts:
"It seemed, until I thought about it a bit, that I had written quite a few novels, many shorter works, and also verses and scraps. Then I understood, by some sort of intuition, that what I had been writing was a never-ending story and that its name was A [Spirit/Spiritual] Story. The name comes from the only thing I have learned about all people: that they are [spirits/spiritual] and that they are sometimes split-off [spirits]. But no one can ever know for sure which part of the split is himself."
If one could work out what he meant by spiritual being, one would have a pretty good sense of what he meant by being a ghost.
I take “ghost” as a way to make spiritual being strange again. The inside-out people and the balloons in Arrive at Easterwine are developed examples of what I have called counterfiguration.
Charles Taylor’s distinction between the porous and buffered self, developed in A Secular Age (2007), helps me describe this difference. I use it as an analogy for the fiction.
The porous self is Taylor's term for the kind of identity that dominated the pre-modern, enchanted world, a cosmos alive with spirits, demons, and meaningful forces. The boundaries of the self were permeable. The outside world could flow into a person's inner life.
Meanings, emotions, and moral states were not seen as generated from within but as imposed by external agents through what Taylor calls influence. A person could be possessed by a demon, transformed by a magic potion, or filled with divine grace.
This same openness meant there was no firm line between the spiritual and the physical. A holy relic could heal the sick, and a curse could ruin a harvest because meaning itself had causal power.

The porous self was thus exposed and vulnerable, living in a world where the borders between mind and cosmos, self and other, were fluid and in constant exchange. Lafferty's characters seem to live in this kind of world.
This contrasts with what Taylor calls the buffered self, the characteristic identity of the modern, disenchanted age. It is marked by a firm, "buffered" boundary that separates the inner world of thought, feeling, and purpose from the outer world, which is understood as neutral and mechanistic. This boundary shields the self, making it feel secure from the spiritual forces that once haunted the porous self.
Within this protected interior, the self becomes the primary source of meaning and order. It no longer discovers purpose in the cosmos but imposes it through disengaged reason and instrumental control. While this shift grants a new sense of freedom, power, and self-possession, it also introduces the central dilemma of modernity.

The same buffer that ensures safety may also cut the self off from deeper meaning. The result is a condition of malaise. It gives us a sense of flatness, disconnection, and a world emptied of the transcendent. Lafferty's art appears to be specifically designed to attack this condition.
Two aspects of Taylor’s account matter here: meanings can be experienced as coming from outside the self, and charged objects can be experienced as having spiritual and physical effects.
The idea is that meanings are not generated from within. They are imposed from without, often by spiritual agents or charged substances. This makes the self vulnerable. A person might be possessed by a demon, filled with divine grace, or overtaken by black bile understood as an external force.
In the enchanted world Taylor describes, a relic can be experienced as a source of healing, rather than only a symbol. Moral meaning and physical effect are not sharply separated.
For the porous self, these two powers often worked together. A single sacred act could bring both physical healing and spiritual renewal. Influence and causal power were fused. The self was not separate from the world. It was an integrated participant in a cosmos where meaning and force were inseparable.
Conversely, the buffered self is formed through the systematic dismantling and denial of the world in which influence and causal power operate hand in hand. The modern, disenchanted worldview establishes a firm boundary between the inner mind and a neutral, mechanistic outer world.
Influence is negated because feelings and meanings are now seen as subjective responses generated from within. They are no longer understood as things that can be imposed by spirits or magical forces. The self is sealed off and protected from such psychic intrusion.
Causal power is also denied by a scientific view of the universe, which runs according to impersonal, value-neutral laws. The spiritual or moral significance of an object does not affect its physical properties. A relic may carry symbolic meaning, but it cannot heal.
The buffered self does not experience these powers. It observes them from a distance, explaining them through reason as cultural beliefs or psychological states. Its identity is shaped not through vulnerable participation but through control and mastery over a world emptied of these deeper, enchanted connections.
Let's consider several examples of the porous self in Lafferty’s fiction. Such instances abound to the extent that one can begin virtually anywhere. In “Dream,” a voice in a “noisome dream” informs the dreamer: “You are not dreaming . . . This is the real world. But when you wake you will be dreaming.” The statement exemplifies an external force that destabilizes the boundary between dream and reality. Similarly, the phenomenon of recurring “wart-hog-people dreams” experienced by the populace, and the question of whether “the wart-hogs were real and the people a dream,” suggest a shared external influence acting upon collective consciousness.
In “Snuffles,” the creature asks Brian Carroll, “How could there be anything in your mind if I did not put it there?” The claim makes the boundary between minds uncertain. A different kind of external control appears in “Aloys,” where the Wreckville group recruits unusual talent because it “cannot have uncontrolled talent running loose in the commonalty of mankind.” Recruitment is social control, however, not the same kind of permeability as Snuffles’ claim.
In “Seven-Day Terror,” Clarence makes things disappear with a device whose instructions he took from Clarissa’s diary. Clarissa brings them back. Asked whether she can do so, she answers, “Why, of course I can. Anybody can. Can’t you?” Her confidence makes the impossible seem ordinary, though the story distinguishes the two children’s actions.
In “Seven Story Dream,” Gilford Gadberry conditions George Handle with a recording played during his sleep. Handle confesses to the murder of Minnie Jo Merry, but Gadberry is the killer. The murder is real; the confession has been planted. The story makes a familiar form of manipulation disturb the relation between memory and responsibility.
These are different kinds of vulnerability: invasion of thought, social control, extraordinary physical powers, and conditioning. They suggest uses for the porous-self analogy without all describing the same process.
Like the porous self, the buffered self appears in Lafferty everywhere, often through societies or individuals who create barriers to shield themselves from chaos, unpredictability, nature, the numinous, or existential vulnerability.
The Camiroi complicate the buffered-self analogy. They live by reason, yet actively import bad Earth art because they cannot produce it themselves. Their interest in imperfection is a dissatisfaction with their own completeness.
Their legend explains this condition as hesitation at the primordial test: they neither fell nor persevered in grace. They describe a “Golden Mediocrity,” but also a hunger for the heights and depths they missed. Their religion combines law and revelation. They cannot simply be treated as people who have chosen to exclude every unruly or spiritual element.
“Try to Remember” offers a smaller comic analogy. Two professors use nearly identical notebooks to manage the details of their lives. The professor we follow takes the wrong book and follows its instructions.
He is Thomas Cromwell, temporarily acting on Professor Diller’s schedule and going home to Diller’s wife. The arrival of the real Diller makes him ask, “If he is Professor Diller, then who in multicolor blazes am I?” The trouble comes from a swap, not the loss of a notebook. His dependence on written instructions is the basis of my comparison with buffering.
“The Polite People of Pudibundia” gives one of the clearest examples of societal buffering in Lafferty’s work. The extreme politeness of the Pudibundians, including their use of “deferential balls” and avoidance of direct address, functions as a “ritual shield” designed to prevent “too intimate an encounter of our persons [which] may be fatal.” The literal danger of unmediated contact (“the direct gaze of the Puds kills,” even themselves) explains why their eyes are “always shielded.”
This is a society that has constructed elaborate social and physical buffers to defend against a potentially lethal existential vulnerability. Their refusal to lie, even when doing so might protect others, further reinforces the rigid, buffered structure of their lives.
In “The Pani Planet,” Ieska says stories must be told under specified ritual conditions. His tale combines conditions that cannot coincide, which becomes a means of withholding information from the human occupiers. The rule about stories of bamboozle is conditional, not a general prohibition on telling them.
The apparent resurrection of General Raddle is a deception. The Pani have disposed of his corpse, and a mimic takes his place. Colonel Zornig uncovers the imposture and defeats the planned coup. The story concerns credulity, interpretation, and manipulation.
Taylor’s distinction is most useful to me when I return to the wording of Lafferty’s Ghost Story statement.
"I understood by some sort of intuition . . . "
Lafferty describes an intuition rather than a deduction. I connect that experience with receptiveness to meaning beyond deliberate reasoning.
". . . that they are ghostly . . ."
Lafferty recreates the experience of the porous self through art because he is spiritually attuned to it himself. The Laffertian ghost is a poetic figure that re-embodies the porous self. What is a ghost? It is a being whose boundaries are not solid. It passes through walls, something that appears often in Lafferty's work. It is present but not entirely material, no matter how we define that. It belongs to an enchanted world.
If this is right, then to say that people are "ghostly" is to say they are inherently porous, whether or not they have withdrawn into buffered individualism. Their inner lives are not sealed off from the world. They remain open and vulnerable to external meanings, spiritual forces, the transcendent, and the feelings of others. Things beyond their control can haunt them. This is the human condition that the modern buffered identity tries hardest to deny.
A brief example to make this clearer and set up the question of doppelgängers. Let's consider one of the most important doublets in Lafferty, Miguel Fuentes and Michael Fountain. Chapter XI of Fourth Mansions has the following epigraph from Ecclesiastes 12:5-6: "— and one fears heights, and he shall be afraid in the road . . . before the silver cord is snapped and the golden bowl is broken, and the pitcher is shattered at the fountain . . . " This sets up Michael Fountain to learn the limits of the buffered self the hard way. Lafferty clearly shows the reader that Michael Fountain, the lecturing humanist, thinks he supports the bowl:
“What we are talking about are the world and the lives which we are given to fashion as our tasks. These are in the form, as I see it, of a large, fine, precious, crystal bowl, the Golden Glass Bowl, which we hold in our hands. True, it is not nearly so large a bowl as we once wished to fashion, but now we have come to understand that it is as large and as heavy a bowl as we are able to lift and hold.”
To follow what happens, one should understand the image from Ecclesiastes: a silver cord from which a golden bowl of oil hangs. When the cord snaps, the bowl falls away from the vertical dimension of existence that had sustained it; metaphorically, this is the silver cord of life and self. The image appears in other Biblical scriptures as well. Michael Fountain, the buffered half of the doublet, sees only the bowl. He's blind to the silver cord and its opening upward into transcendence.
In Past Master, the golden bowl is Golden Astrobe itself, along with its world-age, both wanting to cut the cord that supports them, but in Fourth Mansions, the porous self of Miguel Fuentes destroys the buffered self of his double, Michael Fountain. The climax reveals how the doubling of selves is bound to the dynamic between the porous and the buffered.
Fountain’s speech ends with the bowl falling:
Michael Fountain, dictating privately in his own rooms thirteen hundred miles away, had become highly nervous but he still composed brave words for his lecture: “We come to apex, and it is no way elevated or outstanding; we come to perfection, and to perfect simply means to finish; we come to climax, and it is beautifully flat and undistinguished. We have completed the world. Behold it!” And in some manner Michael Fountain was holding a large, fine, precious, crystal bowl—The Golden Glass Bowl—in his two hands. It was pretty. It was almost substantial. “This is the world,” Michael intoned in a self-induced trance. “This is our lives, this is our final achievement. Worry not that it is small: it is the largest world ever, if we will not allow a larger one. Worry not that it is flawed: we ourselves are the flaws: and if we say that we are not flaws, then who is there to contradict us? Worry not that it is fragile, so long as we are very careful not to drop it.” “Drop it!!” the thunder-clap voice of Miguel Fuentes exploded. Everybody in the entire communication jumped at the cannon-barking violence of that command. And Michael Fountain dropped his world. It tinkled into a thousand tinny pieces. It shattered and all the light flickered out of it. The face of Michael Fountain also broke and shattered and the light went out of it also. He cast himself down and was racked by dry sobs. “How did we go wrong? What did we forget?” Michael moaned.
The epigraph tells us what they forgot. They forgot the silver cord. This is to say that what Fountain forgot was not that there is a minus, but that there is, and always was, something more: a presence to which he was tethered, and which stood above him all along.
". . . and that they are sometimes split-off."
I read the Fuentes/Fountain doublet as an image of a split between openness to a larger world and the wish to make the given world complete. Fountain’s claim recalls Feuerbach for me: "There are no exterior monsters who trouble the world either in attacking it or in defending it. They are not real." This is a use of Taylor’s distinction, not a definition supplied by Lafferty.
In this way, the buffered self draws a firm line between the inner mind and the outer world. It relies on disengaged reason, which separates mind from body and reason from passion. It sees the world as emptied of spirits, gods, and moral force. It is, to quote Michael Fountain again, the "apex" that is "no way elevated or outstanding."
Lafferty does not treat this as our complete nature; he shows us the entanglement of Fountain and Fuentes. He sees it as something we sometimes become when we look at the world and see it as Michael Fountain does: "and it is beautifully flat and undistinguished. We have completed the world." This is the perfectly buffered plane of Flatland.
"But no one can ever know for sure which part of the split is himself."
Here is the central dilemma and cross-pressure of the secular age. It is also a key part of Lafferty's statement. He names the predicament. We are not simply porous or simply buffered. We live in the tension of the split. We build a "split-off" buffered identity to gain safety, control, and freedom. We tell ourselves that this is the authentic, mature version of ourselves.
But our "ghostly" porous nature keeps coming back, in our hunger for meaning, our experience of love, our awe before beauty, our fear of death, and our sense of something beyond. This is what Carmody Overlark’s Studies in the Imagination is getting at in The Devil is Dead.
"Could we understand that world, we would understand ourselves better; for we also are part of that back-brain world to some degree. It was the ‘other people,’ the ‘Ugly’ people who gave to us whatever ghostliness we have, and whatever imagination. We gave only forebrain consciousness."
As a novel, The Devil is Dead suspends the reader in the region of the back brain and the porous self until, almost out of nowhere, it drops the rationalizing explanation of the Neandertal conspiracy, giving the reader Carmody Overlark’s concept of the forebrain to rationalize away what has happened.
The Miguel Fuentes (back brain/porous) and Michael Fountain (forebrain/buffered) difference appears in many places across Lafferty’s work. Sometimes it’s ontological, sometimes psychological, sometimes political, and sometimes theological. Usually, it’s several of these at once. The Devil is Dead stages this difference in its own way, and its doppelgängers are not reducible to those in Fourth Mansions. For instance, it matters that it is none other than Carmody Overlark, that enemy of the fourth mansion, who writes the quoted passage in The Devil is Dead.
Lafferty suggests that we can never know for sure which side of the split carries the cross-pressure. We are caught between two strong ways of being. Is my true self the rational, self-controlled agent, skeptical of revelation? Or is it the open, vulnerable being who still longs for the transcendent and the revelatory? Am I betraying my grown-up, scientific self when I feel that longing, or am I betraying my deeper self when I suppress it? That is what makes this the never-ending story for us.
The porous and buffered selves help me account for features of Lafferty’s fiction that an emphasis on lack can miss. Their value depends on the passages they illuminate.
The Lacanian Real resists complete symbolic representation; simply naming the term does not make it disappear. A Catholic account of sacrament, by contrast, concerns signs that communicate grace and real presence. I see a tension between these accounts. My objection applies when lack is made exhaustive and presence is ruled out in advance.
Petersen might argue that I overlook the radical, materialist, and non-human core of his argument. I would say that I don't. It's that I agree with Lafferty, who wrote in "Notes on the Golden Age," "Consider three trash or pulp fields of the hard and soft sciences: Darwinism, Marxism, Freudism. These three things were real pulp theories, but transmuting nostalgia has kept them working like grist mills."
As a final note, Petersen sees a minus in Lafferty’s ghostliness because of the minus in matter. His explanation is ontological and psychological, but not historical. He writes: “The more these doubles press into space and physicality, the more they exemplify the minus encountered in matter. They are not immaterial but submaterial, shot through with the holes of Lucretian materialism, shadowy subtractions of the Real.”
I also want an account of the doubles to address Lafferty’s treatment of the Fall and of historical change. In his fiction, estrangement from the transcendent takes particular forms in modern life. Taylor’s account of changed conditions of belief helps me describe those forms.
Any account of the doppelgänger motif, ontological or otherwise, must be grounded in both the anthropology of the Fall and the cultural experience of late modernity. This is not because the reader must believe the Fall is real, but because Lafferty did, and he was unusually consistent in the coherence of the beliefs that inform his art. For him, it all hung together. “Now I understood,” he wrote, “by some sort of intuition that what I had been writing was a never-ending story and that the name of it was ‘A Ghost Story.’”

Aloysius Shiplap’s speech near the close of Arrive at Easterwine brings the question of lack and creation together:
“This, Cogsworth, is the limbus lautumiae of which the Sons will write when they understand it more. This is no lost or furtive limbo. It is the quarrying limbo in all its agony and estrus. This is the mother quarry itself. All the grand worlds—which we have never seen, which we can’t imagine—have been sculpted out of it. They are the holes in it, they are what gives it its wild and riven shape. But look how much else new space is left. And look also that the holes do not remain holes. We have gazed at it all wrong: we’ve seen only the dark afterimages, not the bright fire itself. Here in limbo we already have intimation of these creating worlds. The spherical answer wasn’t entirely wrong, nor was the saddle-shaped answer, nor the torus-shaped. From this young quarry may not great worlds still be called?” “We should have guessed it,” said Glasser. “It isn’t as if each of us hadn’t been in one before. We all have been, except Epikt.” “And have I not been,” I demanded.
notes:

Definitions:
P: Lafferty’s doubles/ghosts primarily express a fundamental lack (minus), based on Lacanian Real + Lucretian matter.
S: Sacramental presence = a sign that communicates real presence (a core feature of Lafferty’s Catholic vision).
L: Lafferty’s fiction presupposes sacramental presence, something like porous selfhood, enchanted ontology.
R: The Lacanian Real resists complete symbolic representation. This definition alone does not settle how a Lacanian critic can read sacramental language.
F: A faithful reading of Lafferty’s ghostliness must account for the possibility of sacramental presence.
Premises:
(P1) In the model under discussion, doubles, splits, and ghosts are read primarily as expressions of lack.
(P2) The Real and sacramental presence are different concepts; the argument must show whether a particular use of the first excludes the second.
(P3) Sacramental presence requires that signs can communicate real presence (S ≠ R).
(P4) Lafferty’s fiction, via its Catholic imagination, language, and narrative play, presupposes sacramental presence (L).
(P5) A model that explicitly excludes sacramental presence cannot fully account for passages in which that presence matters to the fiction.
Intermediate conclusion:
(C1) The objection holds if the reading makes lack exhaustive. It does not follow merely from the use of Lacanian terms.
Further premises about interpretive fidelity:
(P6) A faithful interpretation of an author’s work should strive to account for the author’s core metaphysical vision, where it is textually supported. Anyone is welcome to reject this principle.
(P7) Ignoring or negating the sacramental dimension of Lafferty’s fiction contradicts this interpretive fidelity to Lafferty's artistic aims (violates P6).
Final conclusion:
(C2) A reading centered on lack is incomplete where it excludes sacramental presence that the text supports. A partial theoretical reading need not make that exclusion.
Questions for the argument:



