Millions of Lafferty Words, Intellectual Compression, and Teasing Incompletion
Updated: 4 days ago

“In conceiving a story or inaugurating a plot which involves threads weaving with threads, if the thread A, or viewpoint character, should figure with the thread B in an opening incident of numerical order n (with respect to the incidents in the conditions precedent) there must be invented a following incident n + 1 involving threads A and C; an incident n + 2 involving threads A and D; an incident n + 3 involving threads A and E; and so on up to perhaps at least n + 4 or n + 5; and furthermore n must cause n + 1; n + 1 must cause n + 2; n + 2 must cause n + 3, etc.”— Harry Stephen Keeler
"Throughout [Lafferty's] writing career, these various affects and effects were used by Lafferty to construct stories and novels that nestled within larger (but often untold) tales and universes, and were often to be understood as epigonal offshoots of those larger, earlier, linguistically more complex, mysteriously governed worlds. In the end, his corpus as a whole gave off a sense of teasing incompletion and of secrecy: almost as though it was only the entire story (to which his numerous unpublished manuscripts added almost mythic stature) that made sense, that commanded the rest." SFE
I have been thinking about that romantic yet demystifying passage by John Clute. Another John, John Carey, the Oxford don and book reviewer, once wrote that any fine book review must contain such a passage. Carey called it an acid drop. Without its presence, he argued, one has not read a good review. The acid drop flatters the reader.
The twentieth-century rhetorician Kenneth Burke called elements like the acid drop a necessity of good rhetorical form. For him, rhetorical form is the satisfaction of an expectation. Consciously or unconsciously, readers do expect the acid drop in a book review, even a glowing book review, because the acid drop is not a total solvent: it is a high moment of intellectual domination that brings the reader of the book’s review closer to the reviewer than to the author of the book being reviewed. Consubstantiation is with the reviewer, not with the reviewed.
Consider the velvety SFE entry passage. Imagine I am new to Lafferty. I may feel smarter and more informed than I actually am for having read it. (I think something like this has galvanized, quite rightly, Gene Wolfe Inc. by Clute’s rhetorical brilliance in his SFE entry on Wolfe.) I might recognize my recent experience with The Devil is Dead, and then I find the grandeur of my own alienated thought returned to me. Incompletion and secrecy. Yes, just that. Perhaps what I took to be a spiral was a Fraser spiral illusion. Perhaps there is nothing but teasing incompletion. Here is the acid in the drop.

The passage works through an enthymeme, an argument that relies on what the reader supplies. A key part is left undeveloped because the writer assumes the audience already accepts it or will accept it.
The implied argument:
P1. When individual works appear to indicate larger, hidden structures, readers tend to assume those structures exist.
P2. Lafferty’s stories and novels present themselves as shards, offshoots, epigonal fragments of larger, untold, more complex worlds. (True.)
P3. Therefore, there must be a single, unified “entire story” behind the works: a total architecture that commands and explains the fragments.
Clute’s idea of teasing incompletion then undercuts the inference. The totality dissolves. The imagined coherence turns out not to be a key to Lafferty’s corpus but an effect produced by the corpus. A larger, coherent form in Lafferty? Quite likely to be a mirage or a Fraser spiral. The really acidic moment might be Clute’s line that there is something implied to be more linguistically complex than what we see, as if Lafferty trades on what he does not earn fully. The Coscuin Companion and Argo Glossary document the larger forms. The materials exist. Lafferty was not teasingly incomplete. The vagaries of the publishing business failed him.
By supplying the premise and accepting its reversal, the reader has taken the drop. You know you have if you feel satisfied. Congratulations: you have just had the equivalent of a fine book review, one that gratifyingly substitutes for reading the actual book (the supposed larger form). A book review is quicker and cheaper than reading the book. There isn’t enough time to read all the books, after all; that is why reviews exist. Many acid drops are medicinal, even when they are lies.
I appreciate the acid splash in the book trade. Of making many books, there is no end; most deserve a good dip. In this case, Clute leaves open the possibility that Lafferty's secret door opens onto nothing more substantial than what has always already been visible. This is the unpublished work’s “mythic stature,” as Clute puts it. Mythic here is not the good mythic; it is the other kind of mythic, the mystifyingly mythic.
So the SFE reader might think, what is beyond the teasing incompletion? Perhaps it would simply be more teasingly, more incomplete Lafferty. Perhaps Lafferty is best taken as a moving handrail that only seems to lead somewhere. Clute does not say any of this directly, because one leaves parts of an enthymeme unstated. The rhetorician expects you to supply them. That is how an enthymeme works: trust yourself, says the rhetorician, after trusting me to show you the best seat in the house. Clute respects many of the short stories. His acid eats into Lafferty’s larger project, which encompasses the novels.
Lafferty wrote millions of words, and he did so with the mind of an engineer. By his own account, he possessed something close to eidetic recall for written language. He compressed information. His mental audio was nearly lossless, and anyone who reads him will be struck, again and again, by how unerringly he could summon the exact word for whatever he described. His oral style and pragmatic markers hide this finicky precisionism.
Among genre writers, the number of words he used only once is astonishing (see the statistics for the published works). The words are never pretentious, always precise. He also hides his writerly labor. Lafferty used more than nine hundred sources while writing The Fall of Rome, yet he took great care to conceal that scaffolding from the reader’s experience. Darrell Schweitzer mentions one or two.
For most Lafferty readers, he is a short story writer, someone who turns out brilliant, self-contained performances. Part of his genius as a writer is that he was able to present himself this way, and he is thoroughly enjoyable if one wants to read him as science fiction’s master vaudevillian. It is also a bit of a put-on. The man was up to other things. When someone says he did not take himself seriously, it is true. When someone says that implies that he did not take his ideas seriously, it is bullshit, as reading his correspondence quickly reveals.
Lafferty has two radically different strategies, which create different sorts of reading pleasure. There is a modal gap between them. Both depend on informational density. Compression can make a work seem incomplete. Sometimes what seems incomplete is being broadcast at 3700 angstroms. There is the centripetal Lafferty and the centrifugal Lafferty.
I call a Lafferty short story a story world. These story worlds are cosmia, with their own wild logics and metaphysical rules. Each cosmium is both continuous and discontinuous with the others. The ghost story connects them through lines of filiation, overlapping themes, callback phrases, repeated character types, and reduplicative conceptual patterning. I needed new concepts to see this; hence, the concepts page.
Each story world also has its own conceptual architecture, dense networks of allusion, etymological texture, anti-secrets, and unresolved puzzles, along with more than a little didactic axe-grinding. The informational density works within each story and across the corpus. When he is most himself in his short fiction, Lafferty is an easygoing but camouflaged maximalist. That a brilliant maximalist is known for short stories that people call oral is not the least of his weirdness.
Each Lafferty story is architectonic, dense, overbuilt.
Story worlds are linked by patterns, motifs, and ghostly lines of connection.
The reader’s sense of a missing totality comes from:
Connections among the works.
A corpus that remains partly unpublished or inaccessible.
Lafferty’s concealment of his scaffolding.
Clute’s “teasing incompletion” mistakes actual incompletion for a tease. Only Prime is complete. Publication has left much of Lafferty’s design out of view.
The writers I know best and enjoy most are maximalists. I believe the universal shows itself in the particular, so the more detail a literary artist can muster, the better. I am an essentialist, as are many contemporary thinkers, just not the ones who show up in roundtables about literature or all things sociological. Saul Kripke was one, so anyone who thinks essentialism is dead is philosophically illiterate. Essentialism is the reason why the writers I love most are Dante, Milton, Rabelais, Swift, Sterne, Blake, Joyce, Nabokov, and Pynchon. Lafferty is becoming one of those writers for me, but this is a middle-aged accident. Clute’s account of teasing incompletion misses how Lafferty’s metaphysical games orient the reader to Prime.
One of my heroes is Donald Ault, who understood parts of William Blake better than anyone. He was also one of the great champions of Carl Barks because he knew that the visionary contained both Duckburg and The Four Zoas. Ault was not trying to raise low art into high art because those were not categories that interested him. Such visionaries demand architectonic treatment, whatever categories their culture assigns them.
This holds even for bad artists. Terrible artists but interesting ones. I wish someone would be architectonic about one of my favorite terrible writers, the mesmerizing Harry Stephen Keeler (1890–1967). The phantasmatic strategies of Keeler and Lafferty recall the schizophrenic art discussed by Hans Prinzhorn (1886–1933) in Artistry of the Mentally Ill (1922). Both depict a culture already halfway to pathology.

Keeler’s webwork offers a comparison with Lafferty’s intricate plots of the 1970s. I defy anyone to summarize a Keeler plot adequately after one reading. Keeler created a method that made it nearly impossible. He called it webwork: a plot woven from intersecting “threads,” rather than built as a “row of bricks.” These threads are characters, objects, and sometimes mere curiosities. In a webwork plot, an enormous cast becomes entangled in a scheme of staggering complexity and coincidence (think of Lafferty’s version of webwork in The Elliptical Grave or East of Laughter).
Keeler often drew elaborate diagrams to map these structures, in which every encounter exerts a kind of physical force that “deviates” a character’s trajectory, guaranteeing that no strand remains loose for long. Everything gets pulled into a "mathematically" unified, if frequently absurdly contrived, resolution. As with Lafferty’s story worlds, Keeler’s odd formal solution stemmed from his lack of interest in using the novel to explore human interiority. He was a genre writer who did not fit.
Lafferty wants to gratify the human hunger for the Logos. Keeler’s technique was meant to gratify the human hunger for order by forcing the seeming chaos of modern, urbanized life into a perfectly logical, exhaustively interconnected design, a literary Rube Goldberg machine whose gratuitous intricacy is itself the point. Keeler’s totality is non-sacramental, a principled and baroque attempt to seize a whole and make the reader feel it. Its immanent logic differs from Lafferty’s sacramental order.
The totalities Keeler’s webwork produces are neither accidental nor teasingly incomplete, and you will feel this if you are one of the few with the patience to read him. Keeler’s informational density demands tremendous concentration, though digital tools could make the task easier. The problem is that no one cares enough about Keeler to create tools.
Keeler and Lafferty are both visionary and architectonic. Lafferty has the oceanic; Keeler has half-mad webwork. Lafferty is as much an “outsider architectonic visionary” as Keeler, but his readers have not treated him that way. His publication history, artistic development, intense privacy, and alienation from contemporary fashions have obscured that architecture.

The tools in the banner help me keep track of Lafferty’s characters, allusions, and connections among works.
Lafferty poses a useful problem for the digital humanities. The labor required for a full critical apparatus has far exceeded the attention his reputation attracts. George Steiner’s categories of difficulty help distinguish the demands Lafferty makes on a reader.
Contingent Difficulty: Reconstructing Lafferty’s Informational Density
Steiner calls difficulty contingent when a work requires knowledge the reader does not yet possess. Lafferty writes from a theological tradition unfamiliar to many readers. His fiction is saturated with etymological play, what I have called historical bricospolia, metaphysical argument, lost theological debates, Indigenous histories, displaced quotations, and private symbolic systems that exceed any single reader’s grasp.
I use AI-assisted concordances, semantic search, and pattern detection to assemble material scattered across Lafferty’s works.
They bring dispersed references together so that the corpus can be read as a whole. Text comparison, clustering, and searches for allusions help locate recurrent phrases and possible connections. These searches help recover the knowledge his fiction assumes.
Tactical Difficulty: Lafferty’s Deliberate Obliqueness
Steiner’s third form, tactical difficulty, is difficulty by design. It is everywhere in Lafferty. He doesn’t expect the reader to work, but he expects his ideal reader to be smart and to have worked. He obscures transitions, inverts causality, screws with conventions, and embeds metaphysical premises without explication. He rejects the conventional notion of the novelistic character by returning to the older concept of character as type, and then he treats the pre-modern type as fractal, as if type were explosive and radiating outward.
These tactics form the architecture of the Ghost Story. AI tools can help track recurring references to PRIME, symbolic numbers, narrative geometries, and the fractal reappearance of themes across short stories and long works.
Too many readings of Lafferty explain him through a more familiar, less difficult form. Calling his cosmia tall tales is the clearest example. When someone says, Here is a tall tale, it’s usually a sign that the person is skirting the informational difficulty of the story world.
Ontological Difficulty: PRIME, Metaphysical Commitment, and the Limits of Computation
Steiner’s ontological difficulty arises when a text challenges the conditions of meaning itself. This is the center of Lafferty’s project. Petersen is right to recognize that the stakes are ontological, not scientific. Lafferty’s conception of PRIME, the real world, determines the metaphysical order to which his post-novelistic fiction must answer.
His writing scribbles at the boundary where narrative becomes metaphysical inquiry. Digital tools can trace metaphysical motifs across the works. The metaphysical claims require argument.
Tracing these motifs helps us follow how historical mimēsis, Romance, metaphysical comedy, and fabulation all refract the problem of how contingent worlds relate to the World. The final difficulty lies in the reader’s own ontological commitments.


